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the Greenspan regime. Greenspan did not achieve
instantaneous market confidence when he took
office in 1987, but built that confidence quickly
during his initial years as Fed chairman.
Examination of current survey data and the
spread between the yields on conventional and
indexed Treasury bonds indicates that market
confidence in continuing low inflation extends
well beyond Greenspan’s tenure as Chairman.
Institutionalizing market confidence in the Federal
Reserve is a great accomplishment. However, there
is no doubt in my mind that in coming years the
markets will be watching closely to see whether
chairmen following Greenspan will maintain a
low-inflation regime. In recent years, market
confidence has been so great that only a string of
poor policy decisions would have changed infla-
tion expectations. For example, inflation expec-
tations hardly changed in the aftermath of 9/11
and of the oil price increases of 2004-05.
The next chairman will start with a base of
institutionalized market confidence, but the mar-
ket will naturally be somewhat skeptical until
the new chairman has established his or her own
track record. Put another way, the Fed’s inflation-
fighting credibility may be somewhat more fragile
over the next few years than it has been over the
past few years. Almost certainly, future chairmen
will address the issue of whether the Federal
Reserve should adopt a formal inflation target,
which many economists and a number of mem-
bers of the FOMC, including me, have espoused.
SUCCESSFUL CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Effective crisis management is important not
only for dealing with crises but also for instilling
I
t is widely agreed that Alan Greenspan
has been an outstanding Fed Chairman.
Over the years ahead, Fed chairmen will
surely want to extend Greenspan’s record
of policy success. But I ask this question: What
are the characteristics of the Greenspan policy
regime that have led to policy success?
As far as I know, there has been no compre-
hensive study of the characteristics of the
Greenspan regime. To extend the regime will
require an understanding of just what the regime
is. My purpose is to outline some thoughts on
that issue by discussing four key characteristics
of the Greenspan regime. First on my list is low-
inflation credibility—that is, market confidence
that the Federal Reserve will conduct policy to
yield low inflation averaged over any span of a
few years. The other three characteristics of the
Greenspan regime are successful crisis manage-
ment, empirical understanding of the economy,
and predictability of monetary policy. I’ll comment
on all four, but concentrate on predictability issues
as these are, I believe, the most interesting of the
characteristics of the Greenspan regime.
Before proceeding, I offer the usual Fed dis-
claimer—that the views I express do not neces-
sarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Bob Rasche and Dan Thornton,
but I retain full responsibility for errors.
LOW-INFLATION CREDIBILITY
Market confidence in the Federal Reserve’s
ability and willingness to maintain a low trend
rate of inflation has been a core characteristic ofmarket confidence in the Federal Reserve. I believe
that the Federal Reserve has managed crises
effectively throughout the post-World War II
period, but its skills were certainly honed during
the Greenspan years. The major crises during
these years were the stock market crash of 1987,
the financial market disturbance in the fall of
1998 following the Russian default and near fail-
ure of Long Term Capital Management, and the
terrorist attacks of September 2001. The Fed pre-
pared carefully for Y2K, and its preparations
contributed to that event passing smoothly. Ahead
of Y2K and especially following 9/11 the Fed
invested heavily in stronger contingency arrange-
ments for communications among policymakers
and in infrastructure for maintaining essential
payments system services.
The low-inflation environment clearly makes
crisis management easier. For example, the Fed
created a huge amount of liquidity following the
9/11 attacks, but doing so did not raise inflation
fears. The Fed withdrew the extra liquidity as
markets returned to normal; the Fed’s handling
of the crisis clearly reduced the impact of the
event on the economy.
In the years ahead, should there be further
crises, I believe it is reasonable to expect properly
calibrated responses by the Fed. The lessons of
experience have been thoroughly institutional-
ized in Federal Reserve practice.
EMPIRICAL UNDERSTANDING
OF THE ECONOMY
Alan Greenspan has an astounding command
of data. He has applied to raw data a deep under-
standing of economic theory and business practice
and that understanding has enabled him to
track economic developments in great detail.
Greenspan’s highly informed intuition has enabled
him to adjust the stance of policy—the setting of
the target federal funds rate—in timely fashion.
To some degree, Greenspan has institutional-
ized command over data in the Federal Reserve’s
staff, especially staff at the Board of Governors.




The Greenspan years have seen a huge change
in the conduct and transparency of monetary
policy with the result that policy actions have
become far more predictable to the market. When
Greenspan took office in 1987, the Fed did not
disclose policy actions on a current basis. Indeed,
before 1987 Fed decisions were not only murky
to the market but at times even murky within the
System, including within the FOMC, as Daniel
Thornton (2005) has documented. Moreover,
before Greenspan many within the Fed believed
that policy effectiveness depended on taking
markets by surprise.
The evolution to greater transparency pro-
ceeded step by step during the Greenspan years.
The most important single change was that the
Fed began to disclose its decisions on the target
fed funds rate in 1994. Besides disclosure of pol-
icy actions, two other features of the conduct of
policy promoted transparency. One was that the
FOMC adjusted the target fed funds rate in incre-
ments of 25 basis points and the other was that
most adjustments occurred at regularly scheduled
FOMC meetings. Poole and Rasche (2000) docu-
ment the improved predictability of Fed policy
actions.
Clarity of monetary policy has been enhanced
by the general pattern of changes in the target
federal funds rate. To make this point, consider
policy actions in a pre-rational expectations
optimal control framework. In such a model, the
central bank would respond continuously to arriv-
ing information, adjusting the policy instrument
by varying amounts depending on the nature of
the information and frequently changing the
direction of policy action. Such adjustments char-
acterize aircraft autopilots, for example. During
the Greenspan era the Fed has not adjusted the
target federal funds rate in this fashion. A casual
examination of the target funds rate series will
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with changes in the same direction. Short-run
reversals have been relatively rare. I believe that
this pattern of adjustment probably enhances
market understanding of the direction and pur-
pose of policy actions, helping to improve the
predictability of policy. When the central bank is
predictable, it can be somewhat inactive as market
responses carry much of the stabilization burden.
Starting with the policy statement following
its meeting on August 12, 2003, the FOMC began
to provide firm guidance as to the future direction
of policy. The statement said that the Committee
“believes that policy accommodation can be
maintained for a considerable period.” This lan-
guage was repeated until the statement released
on January 28, 2004, when the Committee said
that it “believes that it can be patient in removing
its policy accommodation.” That language was
continued until May 4, 2004, when the Committee
said that it “believes that policy accommodation
can be removed at a pace that is likely to be meas-
ured.” At its meeting of June 29-30, 2004, the
Committee raised the target federal funds rate by
25 basis points and issued a statement repeating
the “measured pace” language. That language
came to be interpreted in the market as creating
an expectation of an increase in the target fed
funds rate of 25 basis points at the next FOMC
meeting and, depending on circumstances, at the
next several meetings. At every subsequent meet-
ing following the June 2004 meeting, through its
most recent on June 29-30, 2005, the Committee
raised the target funds rate by 25 basis points and
repeated the “measured pace” language.
Providing guidance on likely future policy
actions is a significant departure for the Federal
Reserve. Historically, the Fed and other central
banks have been reluctant to provide forward
guidance out of a concern that doing so would
limit freedom of action in the event of new infor-
mation indicating that changed circumstances
called for a change in policy direction. If the mar-
kets have a thorough understanding of policy,
including an understanding that forward guidance
is conditional on the information available to the
central bank at the time the guidance is issued,
then markets should not have difficulty in under-
standing how new information might require
policy action that differs from the guidance.
Experience to date with forward guidance
has been successful but in my opinion it is too
early to tell whether this departure will be suc-
cessful in the long run. The matter will be tested
when changed circumstances require policy
action that differs from forward guidance.
I believe that improved predictability of policy
has had much to do with improved effectiveness
of policy. Poole and Rasche (2000) argue that
changes in policy practice have moved the econ-
omy toward a rational expectations macroeco-
nomic equilibrium in which the Fed and the
markets react in similar fashion to the arrival of
new information. Synchronized responses
between the markets and the Fed enhance the
economy’s adjustment to changed circumstances,
thereby increasing economic stability and effi-
ciency. In the years ahead, maintaining and
extending improved predictability of policy will
be a major challenge for Federal Reserve chairmen.
I’ve sketched some thoughts on four charac-
teristics of the Greenspan regime. Given the econ-
omy’s excellent performance during the Greenspan
era, further study of the Greenspan regime should
command a high priority among monetary econ-
omists. Understanding the sources of success will
be critical to continuing success in future years.
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